Canada Learned the Wrong Lesson from Britain’s HS2
We need to learn from the failure of other projects, not repeat history.
Thank you to those subscribers who have upgraded to paid memberships. It has been very helpful in my efforts to obtain ATIP documents and spend more time on this project. In today’s article, we take a trip to the UK to see if Canada has learned any lessons from the HS2 failures.
SUMMARY CONTENT
Canada’s Alto high-speed rail project is repeating the governance failures that turned the United Kingdom’s HS2 into one of the most costly infrastructure disasters in British history. This article compares the findings of UK studies against the documented record of Alto’s development, and finds the same errors unfolding in real time.
Five parallel failures are discussed.
First, schedule has been prioritized over cost: just as HS2 was pushed forward before designs were mature, Canada accelerated Alto’s construction timeline in September 2025 with Alto’s own corporate plan flagging the acceleration as a threat to social licence.
Second, government oversight is inadequate: as with HS2’s board, which Lovegrove found had developed a false sense of independence from its public mandate, Alto operates at arm’s length from Transport Canada with no ministry representative in a voting board seat, no enabling legislation, and no published oversight framework commensurate with a $60–90 billion project.
Third, costs and risks have been downplayed or withheld: Alto’s sole published financial analysis is a 2021 business case for a slower, different configuration of the project that was subsequently abandoned; no cost-benefit analysis for the 300 km/h specification has ever been released to Parliament or the public.
Fourth, the public interest has been lost: the decision to escalate from high-frequency rail to high-speed rail was driven by an RFP process, investor consultations, and a $330,000 marketing rebranding exercise (not by public deliberation, parliamentary study, or a published business case).
Fifth, consultation has been treated as a public relations exercise rather than a genuine accountability mechanism: Alto’s board documents describe a “Stakeholder Capture Plan” and “hotspot opposition management” approach developed before consultations were held, while expropriation hearing rights were eliminated by statute during the active consultation period. The Bynoe Review’s verdict on HS2 (that consultation “may, from time to time, take second place” and that “hope is not a plan”) describes what went wrong in the United Kingdom after the fact.
FULL CONTENT
In May 2026, the UK government confirmed that HS2 will cost between £87.7 billion and £102.7 billion, compared to the 2013 announced cost of £32.7 billion. The project has already spent £44.2 billion and is roughly halfway complete. It will take another 10+ years to build. The Lovegrove Review stated that the number of years left to complete HS2 is roughly the same as the number of years left when the construction first started in 2020, and the programme will likely need to spend at least what has already been spent to finish the entire project. The speed specification has been reduced from 360 km/h to 320 km/h to avoid the risks of certifying a railway at a speed never operated anywhere in the world and as a way to reduce costs. Canada looked at all of this and decided to build faster. (See HS2 Six-Monthly Report to Parliament, May 19, 2026 (Transport Secretary Heidi Alexander): https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/hs2-6-monthly-report-to-parliament-may-2026 and Lovegrove Review, May 19, 2026: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/lovegrove-review-the-implications-for-the-civil-service-and-wider-public-sector-of-findings-of-the-james-stewart-review).
As a result of the failures of the HS2 project, several reports have been produced in the UK that contain important lessons for future governments involved in megaproject management. Unfortunately, Canada is repeating many of the same failures. This article discusses the HS2 failures and compares them to the Government of Canada’s approach to Alto.
1. Schedule Prioritized Over Cost
The Stewart Review (published June 18, 2025), was critical of the Government’s early decisions which emphasized speed and momentum in construction as a tool to ensure project survival. Stewart found “many examples of key decisions having been driven by schedule rather than cost.” The reasons cited included “pressure from politicians to maintain momentum, fear of HS2 being cancelled, and the belief that costs will increase as a result of delay.” Stewart quotes the Flyvbjerg principle “Think Slow, Act Fast” and notes that “projects don’t go wrong, they start wrong.”
The HS2 2013 Business Case and the Phase 1 Hybrid Bill indicated that there was a goal of the project was to build the best and fastest railway in the world. Stewart found that this top-down vision “drove the scope and dramatically increased cost” and “took the project away from the initial premise of increasing network capacity.” He described a resulting culture of gold plating which “undermined attempts to introduce a culture of cost control.”
Stewart documented “a consistent inability by HS2 Ltd to produce reliable cost and schedule estimates for the Programme and then to deliver within the agreed funding envelope.” Stewart also documented that when cost and schedule pressures did become visible, interventions were not sufficiently aggressive. He cited a Department of Transportation lessons-learned document from 2019 that had already warned: “if the considered evidence identifies delay or cost escalation sponsors need to act decisively, despite the presentational consequences, rather than hoping the situation can be recovered later.” That advice was not followed. Stewart found that “the lag in information becoming available about the scale of cost and schedule pressures on the programme” further delayed recognition of problems, and that even when problems were identified, no equivalent of a private-sector restructuring intervention was deployed.
Canada, less than three months after the release of the Stewart Review, announced it was a good idea to accelerate the Alto timeline. On September 11, 2025, Prime Minister Carney referred Alto to the newly created Major Projects Office. The government's published description of the referral states that the MPO will work to accelerate engineering, regulatory, and permitting work "to enable and target the start of project construction in five years." Economy Minister Dominic LeBlanc stated publicly that the MPO would target construction starting in four years instead of eight. (Major Projects Office, Transformative Strategies Referred, Canada.ca: https://www.canada.ca/en/privy-council/major-projects-office/projects/other/referred.html; MPO Alto project page: https://www.canada.ca/en/privy-council/major-projects-office/projects/other/referred/alto.html; LeBlanc oral statement, CBC, September 11, 2025: https://www.cbc.ca/player/play/video/9.6899211).
Alto itself seems to recognize that the sped up timeline may have negative implications. In it’s Corporate Plan Summary 2026-2027 - 2030-2031 there are three noteworthy references. First, in the SWOT analysis on page 9 that discusses the operating environment, this is noted as a threat:
"The Government's commitment that construction should commence by 2029, including having defined the alignment and completed the impact assessment, has been criticized by some Indigenous communities and environmental groups. This could negatively impact public and engagement on the initiative."
In addition, the issue was raised again in the closing paragraph of Annex 5 (Risks and Responses) on page 50. That reads:
"It is important to note that while the above reflects the current key risks, Alto's risk profile will continue to evolve alongside the initiative, with new risks emerging and existing ones potentially increasing, decreasing, or being mitigated over time. As an example, while risks related to engaging and consulting with stakeholders and Indigenous partners are not currently reflected above as significant risks, these risks may become significant as the initiative advances at its accelerated pace."
Annex 5 also contains a third relevant passage in its introduction on page 48, which directly connects elements of the risk register to the timeline acceleration:
“Alto and Cadence have also co-led the development of the initial risk register to identify, analyze and mitigate risks, with ongoing adjustments based on changes to the initiative, including the Government of Canada’s announcement in September that it intends to accelerate engineering, regulatory, and permitting work to enable construction to start in four years, cutting the original eight-year timeline in half.”
(Alto Corporate Plan Summary 2026-2027 to 2030-31, signed by CFO Tom Roberts on March 13, 2026).
It appears from my reading that the government is pushing the timeframe forward at a speed that Alto itself may not be comfortable with, particularly when it comes to social licence among environmentalists and Indigenous groups (although, I am sure they would also add municipalities, rural communities and farmers to that list as well given recent events). The Government of Canada’s plan to acquire all of the land required for the project before they even decide to build it is a very wasteful expense which also places significant burdens on landowners who may be displaced for a project that never gets built.
I worry that our government is making similar errors when it comes to prioritizing speed and momentum above costs and social acceptability of the project.
2. Poor Government Oversight
The Lovegrove Review found that no Department for Transport or Treasury officials were directors of the HS2 board, and the Department of Transportation Senior Responsible Owner attended only as an observer. The result was that the board “seem to have developed an excessive and ultimately false sense of independence, instead of seeing themselves as overseeing a delivery function.” The review also found that the civil service (which included ministers and other officials) did not meet their obligations. In particular, HS2’s mandate was to deliver a railway within the scope and cost envelope set by Parliament and government. Lovegrove states that when this was not possible, its responsibility was to say so clearly and to accurately express what additional resources, time, and/or scope reductions would be required. The Board failed to perform this task. The reason, in Lovegrove’s analysis, was that the governance structure encouraged HS2 to perceive itself as autonomous rather than as a delivery agent accountable to a clearly defined mandate set by the government.
Alto’s governance largely replicates this problem with even less oversight. Alto’s board has no Transport Canada equivalent in a voting seat. The Minister of Transportation has described the relationship as being at arms-length from the government. The government has published little in the way of details regarding how it is supervising Alto’s work and ensuring that it is acting in the public interest and within its delegated authority. The Alto example has even less Ministerial and Parliamentary oversight.
Senator Marshall identified this gap when questioning Transport Canada Associate Assistant Deputy Minister Vincent Robitaille at the February 4, 2026 Senate National Finance Committee hearing. Senator Marshall noted that the Financial Administration Act required Parliament to receive only a summary of Alto's corporate plan, not the full document, and that Treasury Board determines when even that summary is tabled, leaving Parliament with no legislated accountability mechanism commensurate with the scale of this $60-$90 billion project. Senator Marshall also raised the significant powers given to Alto that impact personal property and expropriation as a reason why oversight is critical. (Senate Standing Committee on National Finance, Witness Testimony, February 4, 2026: https://sencanada.ca/en/content/sen/committee/451/nffn/29ev-57469-e).
The reason that proper oversight is important is to avoid the filtering of significant information away from elected officials and Cabinet. As I have written previously, it is problematic when benefits are exaggerated, risks are downplayed and costs are obfuscated. The government is spending a significant amount of taxpayer money on this project. It is not providing an adequate level of oversight for a project of this scale that will have significant on-the-ground community impacts.
The Ottawa LRT Public Inquiry is also illuminating when it comes to project governance. The Inquiry documented the same pattern as Lovegrove identifies in HS2:
optimism bias in cost estimates,
a proponent-led process without adequate independent oversight, and
a P3 structure that insulated key decisions from government scrutiny.
Ottawa’s LRT was a $2.1 billion project. Alto is projected at $60 to $90 billion on a class 5 estimate. Canada is proposing a far larger P3 with substantially less parliamentary oversight than was even in place for the Confederation Line, with no enabling legislation, no board membership, a Cadence contract with no released terms and no public release of any agreements that may exist as between Alto, the Ministry of Transportation, VIA Rail and others regarding the oversight and division of responsibilities between Alto and the various government departments involved. (The final report from the Ottawa Light Rail Transit Public Inquiry | DocumentCloud).
The insufficient government oversight is playing out in real time in the Prescott-Russell area where I live where residents have significant concerns about Alto. When individuals write to our local MP, the response provided is largely that Alto is an independent Crown Corporation and there is, essentially, nothing she or the government can do. That is a completely unacceptable message to deliver to constituents who are contributing thousands of dollars each to a primarily public project through their tax dollars. It is well past time for Transport Canada to get more directly involved and for proper oversight mechanisms to be put in place - including enabling legislation that clearly outlines Alto’s mandate.
3. Risk and Costs was Downplayed and/or Withheld
Lovegrove reviewed multiple HS2 Accounting Officer Assessments and found Department of Transportation advice that stated the budget “includes a contingency to absorb the cost increases observed in practice by 70 to 75% of comparable projects,” implying ministers should be concerned only if the project performed at the standard of the worst 25 percent. Lovegrove’s conclusion was that: “It was, in fact, impossible to securely make these kinds of comparisons at this point with this quality of information, and articulating the position in this way runs the danger of giving rise to a false sense of security.”
Alto’s $60 to $90 billion figure is described in corporate plan documents as a “class 5 order of magnitude estimate.” It has no published analytical basis for the 300 km/h configuration now being built. Alto’s website states that the costs are “based on the scale of the project and available research, not on final designs or construction contracts." The only published financial analysis is the 2021 Joint Project Office Business Case Update which was for the High Frequency Rail plan that was abandoned. That was provided to the Treasury Board to authorize the RFP, which somehow ended up awarding a High Speed Rail contract instead. No updated business case for the 300 km/h configuration has been published to any parliamentary committee or proactive disclosure channel and I have found no evidence in my ATIP files that such a document even exists. (JPO Business Case Update (December 2021, obtained via ATIP A-2024-004); TC Parliamentary Briefing Q&A, February 21, 2023 (TC Binder #15): https://tc.canada.ca/en/binder/15-high-frequency-rail-0. Alto Corporate Plan 2025-26: https://www.altotrain.ca/en/about-alto/transparency-and-trust).
When asked about the costs by Senator Marshall, this exchange occurred with Alto’s CEO:
Senator Marshall: “Can you start off by telling us about the cost estimate of $60 to $90 billion; where did that come from and who prepared it?”
Mr. Imbleau: “It is not a cost estimate. I don’t want to be picky, but to have a cost estimate, you need to have a proper level of engineering, which we still don’t have. I prefer to use the working assumption. It’s an internal working assumption based on what we got from the three bidders but also our international estimate. You would appreciate it is a fairly wide range because we need more detailed engineering, and it starts with having an alignment, which we will only have next fall.”
Senator Marshall: “It has been in the media and also in the report of the Senate Transport Committee that it was an estimate. Was there a risk assessment? I know that it’s a broad range, but is there a 50% chance it is going to come in at that range, or a 90% chance? I’m just trying to get a handle on $60 to $90 billion...”
Mr. Imbleau: “We call it in the jargon the class 5 estimate. It’s an order of magnitude at this point in time. I want to be prudent and pick an alignment. I cannot have an estimate if I don’t know what I’m building, where I’m building it, so the alignment this fall, then the engineering starting next year. Hopefully, next time I come before this committee, we will have a better estimate than the working assumption.”
Senator Marshall: “I take it from what you’re saying there has been no cost-benefit analysis carried out. Is that correct?”
Mr. Imbleau: “Actually, we did a few economic analyses that my colleague Marc-Olivier Ranger can provide, both macro and micro.”
Senator Marshall: “Is that something that you could provide to the clerk of the committee so we could have a look at it? I’m thinking about not only the cost but also the time frame. How much does a project like this typically cost because $60 to $90 billion sounds a bit on the low side? Is there a document that we can have access to?”
Mr. Ranger: “Thank you for your question, senator. We’ve worked on various benefits of the projects, and there are studies that have been done by third parties, like the C.D. Howe Institute. We do have estimates of the benefits that would be triggered by the project. We have published a very high-level general document on our website. Back to Martin Imbleau’s comments around the working assumption, we are planning on releasing a series of documents that will outline all of the benefits.”
Senator Marshall: “Based on what you’re saying, it sounds like you don’t have a handle on the costs and the benefits yet. Isn’t it possible when you do the cost-benefit analysis, it might show this project is not feasible?”
Mr. Ranger: “We have a fairly good handle on the benefits. Let me rephrase my answer. When we look at modelling and economic studies, there are three layers of benefits you’re looking at. Usually, you are looking at the direct benefits to the users. That’s what you’re referring to when you mention cost-benefit analysis. We do have studies that cover that. In terms of the macroeconomic impact, we’re looking at modelling with Statistics Canada how many jobs will be created. We do have estimates around that. We’re also looking at, based on other G7 countries, what macroeconomic benefits are usually incurred with a high-speed train.”
Absent in their responses is any discussion at all of risks, costs or downsides of proceeding with the project. Clearly those also exist. The answers to the Senator were not responsive and, frankly, are unacceptable in a democratic society. We should not allow Agent Crown Corporations to hide information from the public, Parliament or the Senate. ( https://sencanada.ca/en/content/sen/committee/451/nffn/31ev-57515-e).
In addition, I have found troubling communications in the ATIP file that suggests that on more than one occasion senior public servants withheld cost assessments and downplayed risks in meetings with Government decision makers. I elaborate on those findings in this article. The government was not even being honest to itself internally about the costs, let alone with the public.
4. Speed Specification Raised Costs
HS2 was originally designed to run at 360 km/h which would have been faster than any conventional railway in the world. The May 2026 parliamentary report confirmed this has been reduced to 320 km/h to use proven technology, which would save £1 to £2.5 billion. The Lovegrove Review calls this gold-plating “resulting in a bespoke and highly engineered design.”
Alto’s costs also increased as a result of speed decisions, although Alto’s speeds are more in line with more conventional HSR than what was initially contemplated for HS2. The speed specifications are, nonetheless, not what was initially authorized or delegated to Alto as its mandate for the project. The JPO stated repeatedly in its business case that HSR was not the mandate and had not been considered by it. Documents during that time period are consistent about capping speeds such that grade separations were not necessary.
The 2021 JPO Business Case assessed high-frequency rail at 177 km/h and up to 200 km/hr.
Mandate Letter #1 (December 16, 2022) described the project as a high frequency rail project.
The 2023-24 Corporate Plan, tabled with Parliament, used language of “average speeds up to 200 km/h.”
The October 2023 RFP launch press release confirmed the government required each of three bidders to submit both a 200 km/h base solution and a faster alternative. TC Project Director Graeme Hampshire confirmed to an industry audience in June 2024 that the faster option could reach up to 360 km/h (which was the speed targets set initially in the UK under HS2).
Mandate Letter 2 (August 20, 2024) signed by Minister Rodriguez still used HFR language.
Mandate Letter 3 (March 18, 2025), signed by Minister Freeland, was the first mandate letter to use “HSR” and “300 km/h” explicitly. This mandate letter was signed literally the day before Alto signed the Project Development Agreement with Cadence to Co-Develop a High-Speed Rail Project, committing Canada to spending $3.9 billion on Co-Development alone before Canada even decides to proceed with construction. This is a very similar model that was used in HS2. (JPO Business Case. 2023-24 Corporate Plan. October 2023 RFP launch: https://www.canada.ca/en/transport-canada/news/2023/10/minister-of-transport-announces-the-launch-of-the-request-for-proposals-for-the-high-frequency-rail-project.html. Hampshire/TRACCS presentation (via Transport Action Canada): https://www.transportaction.ca/topics/intercidy-rail-and-bus/high-speed-options-standards-challenges-for-hfr/. Mandate Letter 2 published in Amended 2024-25 Corporate Plan. Mandate Letter 3 published in 2025-26 Corporate Plan.
No cost-benefit analysis for the decision to escalate from 200 km/h to 300 km/h has ever been published. No risks have been publicly addressed at all, leading rural residents and those concerned about wasteful government spending to fear for the worst. The government committed $3.9 billion to co-development before a single estimate for the 300 km/h configuration or any cost benefit analysis provided to the public. The costs and downside risks are now under intense scrutiny by the public, especially by rural farm owners and landowners concerned about early expropriations prior to the Government making a final investment decision. To me, the whole things looks like the Government was upsold during the procurement process and that there was never a proper analysis of the increased costs and community impacts associated with HSR.
There has been very little stated publicly by the government or Alto regarding the change to a HSR project. No studies regarding the impacts of such a change have been released. It appears that the pivot from high-frequency rail to high-speed rail was possibly driven by marketing concerns, not actual evidence. The Canadian Press confirmed in May 2025 that Alto paid $330,000 to Cossette Communication Inc., a Quebec-based marketing firm, to rebrand the project because there was “widespread disinterest” in the high-frequency concept. The rebranding direction was described as signalled by CEO Martin Imbleau to “ensure the project placed a greater emphasis on speed.” (Canadian Press, Christopher Reynolds, May 28, 2025: https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/business/company-news/2025/05/28/via-rail-subsidiary-paid-quebec-marketing-firm-330k-as-it-pivoted-to-high-speed-rail/).
5. Remembering the Public Interest
In the Stewart Report, the author discussed the “political sublime” problem. He explained that the HS2 Programme had no buffer against political disruption. The practical consequence was that political pressure for action pushed the project forward “on schedule” before there was sufficient design maturity, and caused progressive changes in scope. The constant changes undermined the clarity and stability of requirements that any successful project requires. His finding on culture is particularly pointed: the delivery of the Programme was dominated by the desire to build “the best”. That’s an institutional drift away from the original public purpose (increased capacity) toward an engineering and prestige objective that dominated the programme’s internal culture.
The Ottawa LRT inquiry is also enlightening on this point. It found that the various parties prioritized their own institutional and commercial interests over the public. The LRT inquiry found that the parties (Rideau Transit Group, the City, SNC-Lavalin) became so consumed by their contractual relationships, liability positions, and commercial interests that the actual purpose of the project (a functioning transit system for Ottawa residents) receded from view.
I am slightly concerned that both Alto and the Government have lost sight of the public interest when it comes to Alto. A few factors point in that direction, including:
Decisions made without public input: the increased speed decision coming from an RFP, consultations with investors and a marketing initiative rather than from consultations with the public, parliament or any public discussion or debate. Nobody ever asked the public if anybody wanted HSR and Parliamentarians and the Transportation Committee had no opportunity to study or debate it.
The public is identified as a group to be managed rather than consulted: I have written elsewhere about Alto’s Stakeholder and Indigenous Community Capture plans that were discussed at Alto Board meetings. That approach has Alto’s role exactly backwards. Alto’s purpose is not to sell a product to the public. It is to build a product that is in the public interest and that requires actually consulting with the public about major decisions - such as the choice to pursue HSR when HFR had been the original mandate. I do not know who Alto is serving, but it is not the public.
Information withheld from those concerned: everyone in the study corridor is currently being held in an information vacuum with the best information about the project being published by volunteer citizens who are using their spare time to obtain ATIP documents and present other research that the government and Alto has not. A public project needs to provide open and honest information to the public, not do its best to hide everything. Alto is not even providing certain information to municipalities without them signing an NDA, a completely inappropriate practice for a public project in a democratic society.
In addition, Alto has hired the leading experts in megaproject cost overruns but has not shared their opinion or work with Canadians or Parliament. On June 25, 2024, VIA HFR published Advance Contract Award Notice PAS240625-002-00, signalling its intention to sole-source a contract to Oxford Global Projects UK Limited, based at John Eccles House, Oxford Science Park. The contract was to begin July 15, 2024. The scope of services named three deliverables:
Challenge Board: establish and lead one or more Challenge Boards following academic peer review protocols, comprising internal and external experts to review workplans, progress, costs, and risks. Reports to go to both VIA HFR management and the Board of Directors. [Significantly, they do not report to Transport Canada].
Reference Class Forecast: provide analytics from a statistical database; compile should-cost, should-schedule, and risk exposure models; establish an RCF workbook reflecting the Work Breakdown Structure of the project, recalculated throughout the contract.
Expert draw-down support: engage world-leading academics and practitioners with HSR experience to challenge plans and decisions.
Oxford Global Projects is the firm co-founded by and associated with Professor Bent Flyvbjerg, formerly Chair of Major Programme Management at Oxford University’s Saïd Business School. Flyvbjerg is the world’s most cited scholar in megaproject planning and management. His database of over 20,000 projects is the commercial product of decades of academic research. Significantly, Flyvbjerg also pushes for transparency when it comes to public projects, which has clearly not been the case when it comes to Alto (ACAN PAS240625-002-00 (June 25, 2024). Flyvbjerg credentials: Oxford Saïd Business School profile: https://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/about-us/people/bent-flyvbjerg and Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bent_Flyvbjerg. UK HM Treasury Green Book and Flyvbjerg/COWI 2004 study: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1302.3642). The public would very obviously be interested in the work output from this contract.
6. Consultation and Engagement is Not the Problem, Not Doing So Is
The Bynoe Review (2016) and the Parliamentary Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee that preceded it characterized HS2’s consultation process as a “one way box-ticking exercise with no genuine two-way engagement,” finding that consultation events had turned into “public relations exercises” with information too generic to be useful and often inconsistent. The same Committee found that HS2 Ltd had exhibited a “defensive style of communication” and had not treated its duty to the public “as a matter of primary importance.” The Bynoe Review’s conclusion was: “It is not hard to envisage that, amongst the pressures and priorities of an organisation given this task, high quality community engagement may, from time to time, take second place — hope is not a plan.” As someone in the Alto study corridor, all of that sounds very familiar.
The Bynoe Review also identified specific behaviours constituting “mal-administration”. Many of these also apply in the case of Alto including:
holding back information when it should have been provided;
failing to convey uncertain information properly;
failing to consider representations in a timely manner; and
choosing the wrong time and medium to deliver significant and sensitive information to affected people.
The Stewart Review (2025) added that HS2’s board and leadership had developed (as noted above) “an excessive and ultimately false sense of independence, instead of seeing themselves as overseeing a delivery function” and that manifested in the way in conducted community engagement. The entity behaved as if its duty was to the project itself rather than to the public on whose behalf the project was being built.
Alto is repeating all of the same errors and is already facing significant opposition from various communities, individuals, environmentalists and some Indigenous groups. The opposition has only grown since the launch of their consultations, which some have described as being the equivalent of attending a Timeshare Sales Pitch presentation. It is reported that nobody at the consultation meetings were taking notes, that they were not able to answer basic, practical questions about the project, and the route options being considered were not even presented to the public at those consultations or online.
Alto’s consultation failures are architectural and deliberate. The Stakeholder Capture Plan and hotspot opposition management approach were discussed at the board level before any consultations were even held. The legal elimination of expropriation hearing rights was enacted during the consultation period itself in a budget bill. Land study notices went out and Lidar tests were happening before consultations closed. The information withheld from the public (the 1,700 properties impacted, the 500 farms, the Transit Oriented Development revenue model, the routes being considered and the suppressed business case) were all withheld from the public during the consultation.
In summary, Alto and the Government of Canada have set out on a path that is quite similar to the HS2 project. This is yet another reason why this project needs to be immediately paused, reconsidered and proper consultations with impacted communities held.